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STEGANOGRAPHY AS A THREAT - FAIRYTALE OR FACT? 
 
Tom Cleary  
Independent Researcher, Perth, Australia 
 
Abstract 
Almost since the birth of the Internet, there has been a fear that steganographically-encoded threats would be 
used to bring harm. Serious consideration has been given to the idea that merely downloading an image could 
introduce malware. Yet, for decades, evidence of this malware channel has been missing in action. There is still 
an unwritten assumption that images are harmless. Many vendors have implicitly avoided producing defences 
against steganographic threats. Is it truly impossible to make a widely harmful exploit this way or have 
malicious actors accepted general wisdom? Three recent papers suggest that there may be a new chapter ahead 
of us in this field. Practicable methods employing steganography for real world attacks are being uncovered. 
Early evidence supports the assertion we are seeing new developments in this field, thus far. So, are we seeing a 
new frontier in exploit development or is there another false dawn for steganographic threats? 
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CONTEXT 
Since very early in Internet development, scholars have considered the role that a harmful image could play in 
stealthy intrusion (Fabien, 1998). Early publications showed the results of surveys conducted to baseline the 
presence of steganography in collections of images (Provos & Honeyman, 2001). The results were unsurprising; 
very little evidence of this threat style was seen. Over the decades, other studies followed from these papers and 
confirmed that malicious actors do not appear to use steganography in the wild (Sujatha, Purushothaman, & 
Rajeswari, 2014). Yet, the idea that methods could be found to bypass all existing defences with a simple picture 
persist in the imagination of both defenders and attackers. Recently, there has been credible evidence published 
of developments being made using steganography to produce viable compromises in the real world. 
As Internet defences evolved, the attacker community built improved malware in parallel with, and reflective of, 
defender activities. Where harm was caused, defences improved (Grimes, 2011). Since the malware community 
looks to gain maximal advantage and since most advantage was gained through viruses, trojans and remote 
access tools (RATs), these exploit methods were where most defensive effort was spent. Part of this evolution 
may be caused by Moore's Law preserving the balance between defnders and attackers, where costs remain 
equivalent. Part may be a reaction to organisational perceptions of benefit from investment - enough iron to 
defend against known threats is the risk tradeoff point. If defenders budget too much effort to repelling advanced 
but unlikely threats, then lack of reaction to ‘clear and present danger' from common threats will cause budgets 
to suffer. This tradeoff enforces preparation only for risks visible to fiscal managers.  
Whilst justifiable and defensible, this is a position which clearly enables support from senior management and 
also fosters minimized spending on security defence. Management loves this idea. Unfortunately, the side effect 
is that nothing to counter novel threats will be supported. 
In recent years, advanced persistent threats (APTs) have forced a change of approach onto businesses, intent on 
moving towards increased virtual presence and minimized costs. For security professionals the worrying aspect 
of this change is that business' reluctance to acknowledge novel threats prevents keeping pace with the reality of 
deployed malware. In fact, business is so resistant to confronting the changing landscape of cyber attacks, we are 
in an era where the only way to compel improvements in protection seems to be to remove chief executives from 
failing organizations (Basu, 2015). The experiences of Target, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management and 
Ashley-Madison show that this trend is alive, well and not limited to any sector of the market. To attackers, this 
probably means that improvements of organisational defences will be seen in the relatively near future. 
At its simplest, steganography is a way of hiding one digital object inside another by taking advantage of the 
various slack spaces, redundancies and unused encoding spaces information standards provide. This allows a 
steganographer to hold malicious material in plain sight. It is increasingly popular in places where other, usually 
more direct, exploit methods would not succeed. The methods commonly used to encode steganographically 
concealed content into an image are many and varied, but began in earnest with "least significant bits" (LSBs). 
LSB encoding is available as a side effect of using colours in image files. Colours do not require a full byte to 
represent a pixel, but image rendering code takes sequences of bytes to represent those colours, for ease of 
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alignment. Many tools can be used to stuff additional content into an image through LSBs, undetectable to 
humans. Pattern detection by code is effective, to a degree, because whatever convention the attacker uses to 
represent his own information, the original image and the altered image are unlikely to contain similar variations 
in content, in the same places. So, adding differing LSBs to an area where colours are the same, for example, 
should be detectable to a program. Whichever method is used to conceal content, differences in entropy should 
be detectable, especially if one can compare to the original image. Sadly, those opportunities rarely present 
themselves real-time, on the Internet. Methods that stand alone are less effective in finding steganography in use. 
The basics of practical steganography include elements of robustness, where common image transformations 
should not eliminate hidden content. However, using cryptography in addition to steganographic methods tends 
to reduce robustness whilst assisting in hiding content. Making hidden content appear random through 
cryptographic means, increasing the difficulty in detecting steganography has the disadvantage that anything 
which alters encrypted content may make it irretrievable (Al-Ani, Zaidan, Zaidan, & Alanazi, 2010) For 
attackers intent on compromising Cloud hosted systems, when defenders are conditioned to trust the efficacy of 
preventive controls and where volatile populations of images accompany end user behaviours, faith in harmless 
images may be misplaced. Although known instances of detected steganographic methods in the wild are rare, 
more are being uncovered. As organisations lose faith that they are safe because evidence of compromise is not 
visible to management, they may need to look more deeply at their stored content. In many cases, evidence of 
compromise may not be visible to anyone, especially if no-one is actively seeking it out. Prevailing attitudes to 
security practice may need to adapt to increasing use of hidden attacks, when the penalty is attrition at the top 
levels. 
So, from the perspective of an attacker, the time has come to start a new development push and implement tools 
to exploit different channels. This might include channels that have a long history, but have been ignored by the 
industry - steganographic channels. 
CURRENT SITUATION 
It is widely acknowledged that the major players in the malware industry are either backed by organized crime or 
Nation States ("Cyber and Technology Enabled Crime," 2015). The ‘hobbyist' culture that prevailed in preceding 
decades is largely extinct. It has been replaced by a world where the individual hacker is paid to develop exploits 
to the specification of an employer. Whether driven by bug bounties, crimeware scams or military/defence 
organizations, few truly independent, significant developers of malware remain. The nature of the generated 
malware is also different. The reason that noisy attacks like ‘Code Red' and ‘Slammer ' have vanished isn't likely 
to be because Law Enforcement has succeeded in removing the originators from the scene (despite the hype that 
Kevin Mitnick's incarceration once generated..) It is more likely because attackers have sought to monetise what 
they find during their activities. What would be the point in owning someone else's machine and not extracting 
as much value as you can? Attackers do not want the ‘shoutz and greetz' any more. They would much prefer to 
get paid. Mainstream businesses are finally waking up to the changed opposition they face. With the move to 
‘the Cloud' ahead of us, we are about to experience a sea change in approaches to defence against malware. If 
the thesis presented here is correct, we should also see evidence that a change of approach is being developed 
amongst attackers. The principle is that we need three recent, concrete examples to suggest an idea is not entirely 
attributable to chance. I will present three recent instances where the idea of using steganographic means to 
compromise organizational defences have proven to be tangible, instead of imaginary. 
‘STRAWS IN THE WIND' 
Case One  
Saumil Shah, an independent security researcher, has published a paper that discusses using malicious images as 
an attack vector for a complete compromise in an image (Shah, 2015). He develops a thesis that states using 
‘slack space' in design formats of a variety of popular image standards permits pictures to be used as malware 
delivery containers. To demonstrate the proof of concept he has published detailed methods for using PNG and 
JPEG images that can be rendered as visible images and as Javascript, simultaneously. The idea is that a web 
page provides instructions to visiting browsers, which automatically run the exploit. The exploit is hidden in a 
real image, which can pass any of the tests currently in use for edge protection - it is a real image, for most 
purposes. The trick in this method is to use some area of the file containing the image data to expose attributes 
recognizable as a browser script language, for example Javascript, close to the start of file. Unlike previous 
methods, this one doesn't depend on the mismatch between auto-compressed attributes at the end of a file and 
most image formats which conform to the ‘Tag, Length, Value' sequential evaluation method from the start of 
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file. This means that precautions taken for prior generations of steganographic attack detect these files poorly. 
That said, this is not the ‘silver bullet' of steganographic exploitation. One of the main benefits for attackers 
would be if they could use the almost universal JPEG format alone for delivering attacks. Indeed, this proof of 
concept does permit JPEG to contain the attack. However, the published method depends on having the JPEG 
‘size' field contain characters interpretable as Javascript comments. This means that any file which has the field 
set to a value other than hex "00 10" would be suspect. Being able to easily spot likely attack images would 
negate most of the advantage of the method. Examination of all the JPEG files cached on an active Proxy server 
showed no files with a header value other than that above. This suggests that a viable exploit may not come 
through this path unless a valid and widely adopted reason to change header fields emerges. At present, this 
seems unlikely. 
Case Two 
Operation ‘Tropic Trooper' - this campaign was brought to light by Trend Micro earlier this year. It has all the 
hallmarks of a ‘tried and true' phishing exploit, with the interesting exception that it uses steganographic 
methods to evade the edge protections of some sensitive organizations in Asia, notably Taiwan. The initial 
response to the phishing campaign is an image file that is decoded with a string known to the attacking script. 
Once inside an infested client, the typical sequence of securing a backdoor, hiding itself and pivoting to entrench 
itself in the organizational fleet takes place alongside ‘calling home' to its' C&C herder. The paper published by 
Trend suggests that this APT has been in place since 2012. (Alintanahin, 2015) The use of a typical botnet style 
mechanism, linked to the use of steganography in the course of an APT infestation would seem to be an increase 
in sophistication over the traditional view of steganography. Typically, it has been used merely to hide passive 
information in transit. The paper also hints that the use of steganographic techniques is gaining popularity with 
the more esoteric protagonists on the Net. The worry is that where they lead, others follow.  
Case Three 
One of the recent Mandiant papers concerns a tool they have called ‘Hammertoss' ("HAMMERTOSS:  Stealthy 
Tactics Define  a Russian Cyber Threat Group," 2015) Mandiant attribute ‘Hammertoss' to ‘APT29', a group 
believed to be a Russian Government team. The malware is described as being a binary attack. That means the 
attack is not complete until both initialization code and the actual attack are present inside the victim 
organisation's defences. They are inserted independently of one another. Interestingly, the latter element is 
delivered as a steganographically-encoded malware image. The malware is decoded by a Javascript fragment 
cached previously, which is activated by a string from an external source matching a value computable by the 
script. It collects a decoding value, extracts the malware from the image and triggers the attack. The actions 
performed by the script appear to be a simple end user lookup to a popular social site like github or twitter. 
This is a significant development in the history of steganographic malware, because it has been found in the wild 
by a significant player in the security field and uses a mechanism that would defeat the vast majority of currently 
deployed technologies. It extends the repertoire of those responsible for APTs and may be the vanguard of a new 
class of attacks. 
Mandiant is a unit of Fireye, a "rising star" of the security industry. The publicity they gained during the Target 
compromise was widespread and favourable. Indeed, the fact that a Fireye product raised alerts to Target support 
personnel about the ongoing intrusion the moment it occurred, was one of the most telling points in the 
subsequent post compromise review (Riley, Elgin, Lawrence, & Matlack, 2014). The fact that no-one reacted to 
those alerts may be a significant factor in the downfall of the then CEO. Mandiant have continued to publish 
research papers relating to previously unknown attacks and attackers, raising awareness of the torrent of novel 
attacks pouring onto the Net. In addition to expanding awareness of the new methods in use, they highlight the 
insidious nature of these stealthy intrusions. This reinforces the view that current preventive measures are 
worthless against a skilled and persistent attack. The current crops of defensive tools no longer suffice. They 
must be replaced by more effective controls. 
As has happened with ‘malvertising' in recent years, improvements in detection by defenders are blunted by 
changes of tactics by attackers. Attackers are traditionally seen as competing for ‘contested ground' (Tzu, ?), 
avoiding open assault, instead choosing methods that play to their own strengths. This reveals the nature of 
Internet defences in clear detail. In 1984, the IRA said, "Today we were unlucky, but remember we only have to 
be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always"  (Taylor, 2002) with reference to the ‘Brighton bombing' which 
nearly destroyed the U.K. Government. It epitomizes the asymmetric situation that attackers seek. The 
anonymity provided by the Internet linked to the visibility and stability prized by those promoting an 
organization means that true parity for defenders is unlikely to exist. On the Internet, you can't dodge the bullets 
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or you lose your followers. To ensure longevity for an Internet based organization, the Target example suggests 
investment in modern detection methods will be a source of value. This will be true so long as incident response 
is properly resourced. It seems likely that we are about to find plenty of obscurely hidden attacks leaking past 
our traditional tools. ‘Hammertoss' may be the first public indication that attackers are seeking more productive 
methods. 
EXTRAPOLATION 
Steganography is considered too expensive to defend against, because reliable methods for detecting it do not 
exist. Absence of demonstrable assurance leads many organisations to conclude that defending against 
steganography is a waste of resources. This was recently confirmed in an Intel Malware Security group 
newsletter (Intel, 2015). A statement in the newsletter relating to use of images that contain an extra 
steganographic payload which "doesn't affect the content itself, it is hard to distinguish and difficult to detect" 
simply states the implied threat that malware authors use of steganography may present. It's hard to defend 
against and no fully assured detection exists. The examples above would indicate that there are perceptible 
moves by the attacker community to remain "ahead of the game" when the industry is moving to Cloud based 
services. This evidence implies that the attacker community pays close attention to reactions by defenders and 
looks forward to likely changes in behaviour of their true targets - naïve end users. Examples like the 
compromised businesses discussed above make clear that absence of risk appetite in commercial organisations 
presents a great opportunity for attackers prepared to invest in novel methods. End users who have been 
conditioned to use images in high volume uses (e.g. Facebook, Snapchat etc.) add to business incentive for 
"giving a bye" to "passive content". The sheer volume of images handled by most conventional organisations in 
using Web based services may make any realistic defences economically infeasible. Until such time as a 
practical method to reliably detect hidden content is available advantage lie with attackers. For many businesses, 
the window of opportunity presented to hostile players may not only lose them board members, it may include 
the need to pay enough compensation to harmed customers that the affected companies could fold. 
Whether the content is hidden in LSBs, Frequency Domains or any other organised encoding artefact, keeping 
long lasting integrity of malware would be a real concern for attackers. Instead of actively spreading through a 
population like a worm or virus, passive spread through user behaviour would enhance attacks. Attackers would 
keep pressure on maintaining  positive detection rather than attracting attention to their tools. This implies that 
stealthy content must survive common image operations performed in Web services (such as format conversion, 
re-sizing, cropping etc.) One of the obvious needs for an attacker travelling this route would be something that 
can restore the integrity of their product in the event that an impaired payload is placed on an important target. 
This may be the crucial distinction between previous attempts to provide an "all-in-one" payload and the 
steganographic successes of the future. A binary attack might bring an "on-demand" botnet within the grasp of 
attacker communities. A major problem with many attacks is that once they are in place, they are detectable per 
se. Standard defensive mechanisms can then be prepared to detect and eradicate them. Even with the recent 
proliferation of polymorphic and overwhelmingly individualised payloads, traditional Vendors have not been 
displaced from their market. Once a situation where attacks can be hidden "in plain sight" and target systems can 
be brought within grasp of an anonymised controller who can control a botnet on no notice exists, then any 
"clean bill of health" for a system can be true only for a very short period of time. With the ability to produce a 
payload inside a trust boundary with only "normal" Web traffic necessary to activate it by methods that must be 
discovered in advance of the threat being deployed, the reaction time of defenders is minimised and the effort 
expended to uncover threats is raised. This is not a recipe for minimised cost. If organisations are not prepared to 
build effective defences for novel threats, they will need to budget for increased levels of incident response or, 
perhaps, die. A side effect of this scenario may be that the life span of a "zero-day" exploit is extended, because 
once a successful compromise is in place, only those who have prepared to deal with novel threats may be able 
to uncover  them. The investment made by attackers in the tools of their trade may be more easily defensible, 
under those circumstances. Perhaps the idea is to avoid having to buy so much expensive attack code, whilst 
remaining effective in compromising target organisations. Maybe it's purely to commodify intrusion to the point 
that any unscrupulous individual can run a profitable ransomware campaign. Whatever the motive, it seems that 
a level playing field for defenders remains a distant dream. 
CONCLUSION 
The major conclusion we can draw from these examples is that steganography has not lost its persistent 
attraction. Its appeal to cyber attackers has not grown less over time. Indeed, the fascination is still strong for 
steganographic methods, particularly amongst those engaged in finding ways to avoid or misdirect defender 
reactions. Part of this fascination is probably innate. The simple, childlike joy found in magicians or ‘trompe 
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l'oeuil' artefacts is reflected in the attention paid to a simple mathematical hallucination. Steganography is easily 
accessible to ordinary people. Whether for preserving confidentiality in the exchange of messages or in 
smuggling malware past vigilant defences, steganography presents a tangible challenge to defenders. This makes 
it worthy of serious consideration in planning. Particularly when the blind spot for "passive content" threatens to 
provide an entirely new field of attacks against systems already being moved to more available platforms, 
ignoring novel threats in plans may be fatal. We would be wise to consider developing effective ways to detect 
malware that arrives as an image. A likely consequence will be a need to scale up investment in hardware to 
reduce latency when crossing boundaries. The average acceptable wait for content is still four seconds. (Strange 
how that doesn't increase?) So, if we are to continue defending against old threats, as well as commissioning 
capability to deal with novel threats, then more machinery, resources and time will have to be allocated. Most of 
it will be devoted to improving reactions against previously unknown threats. The question becomes how we do 
that? 
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